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On June 25, 2015, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Texas
Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Proj-
ect, Inc.,' and fair housing advocates breathed a collective sigh of relief.
The decision, written by Justice Kennedy for a five-to-four majority, up-
held the use of disparate impact theory in cases brought under the Fair
Housing Act.
The fair housing community had been understandably nervous about
the case. In recent years, the Supreme Court had expressed skepticism
about disparate impact theory in other contexts 2 and a willingness to
1. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
2. For example, in Smith v. City of Jackson, a badly divided Court upheld the use
of disparate impact theory in claims brought under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act, but narrowed the scope of such claims significantly. 544 U.S. 228
(2005). Only four justices endorsed the holding that disparate impact theory was
cognizable under the statute. The fifth, Justice Scalia, concurred separately to
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curtail the application of other civil rights statutes.' The Court had tried to
take up the issue of disparate impact in housing, granting certiorari in two
previous cases, Magner v. Gallagher4 and Township of Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly
Gardens Citizens in Action.s Both of these cases settled before oral argu-
ment, in part because fair housing advocates were worried about the pos-
sible outcome. In the absence of a circuit split on disparate impact and
with new regulations issued by HUD endorsing the theory, it was difficult
to see why the Court was suddenly interested in hearing the issue. Com-
mentators predicted the worst.6
In light of the fears about what the Court might have done, the recent
ruling has certainly been cause for celebration. Besides upholding the avail-
ability of disparate impact theory, it contains a powerful affirmation of the
law's commitment to advance residential integration. Yet supporters of fair
housing, particularly as it relates to affordable housing and community de-
velopment, might not want to crack open the champagne just yet. That is
because in a relatively obscure paragraph buried deep within the opinion,
the majority telegraphs a strong hint at how many of these cases will be
reviewed-not favorably-on the merits. The extent to which this will rep-
resent a change from the status quo, in which many disparate impact claims
already founder, remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the opinion contains a
make clear that his agreement was solely out of Chevron deference to an existing
EEOC regulation that would allow it. Id. at 243. In Ricci v. DeStefano, the Court re-
fused to allow a municipality to use fear of a disparate impact lawsuit as a reason
for disregarding a qualifying exam for firefighter positions, where the exam had
clearly had a disparate racial effect. 557 U.S. 557 (2009). Justice Scalia concurred se-
parately in that case to warn of a coming collision between equal protection and
disparate impact theory. Id. at 594. In Alexander v. Sandoval, the Court held that
there is no private right of action to enforce disparate impact regulations promul-
gated under Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964. 532 U.S. 275 (2001). Many years
earlier, in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the Court held that
disparate impact theory could not be used for constitutional claims.
3. The Court had recently struck down the pre-clearance portion of the Voting
Rights Act in Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), and held that mixed
motive theory was not available to plaintiffs in suits brought under the ADEA in
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
4. 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011).
5. 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013).
6. See, e.g., Jamelle Bouie, The Next Assault on Civil Rights, SLATE, http://www.
slate.com/articles/news-andpolitics/politics/2014/ 10/the-supremeCourts
next attackbonscivil-rightsithe justices will_1ikely.html (predicting that "[t]he
court will hear disparate impact, and most likely . . . end it"); Heather Digby
Parton, Supreme Court's Civil Rights Backlash: How A New Case Could Set Us Back
Decades, SALON, http://www.salon.com/2014/10/20/supremecourtscivil
rights backlash how-a new-case could set us back-decades (noting that "[a]
new challenge to anti-discrimination tools looks likely to prevail").
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good deal of guidance for advocates, housing providers, and municipalities
for how to navigate the legal landscape in which disparate impact remains
a fixture.
This article begins with a brief history of disparate impact theory as it
relates to fair housing cases. It then proceeds to an overview of two pre-
vious cases on this issue to reach the Supreme Court in recent years. Next,
it analyzes the Inclusive Communities opinion, discussing both the Court's
affirmation of integration as a fair housing goal and its skepticism of
whether plaintiffs can succeed using disparate impact theory in cases
like the one at bar. The article concludes by locating the opinion's focus
on competing priorities within the historical tension between affordable
housing/community development and integration and discussing the
ramifications that this tension has for the use of disparate impact theory
going forward.
I. Background on Disparate Impact and Fair Housing
Disparate impact theory allows a discrimination claim to be cognizable
even in the absence of evidence of intentional discrimination. Instead, the
fact that a facially neutral act, policy, or practice has a disproportionate ad-
verse impact on a group of people with an identified, protected character-
istic can be enough to allow a plaintiff to state a claim for discrimination.
Disparate impact theory was first recognized by the Supreme Court in
a Title VII case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 7 In that case, the Court was con-
sidering a challenge to a power company's policies for the hire and trans-
fer of employees. Specifically, the company instituted a policy requiring a
high-school diploma and/or a passing score on an IQ test and the Won-
derlic Personnel Test for hire and promotion. Although this had the effect
of excluding a disproportionately high number of blacks, the company ar-
gued that the requirements were neutral, that they would be applied
equally to whites and blacks alike, and that there was no showing of dis-
criminatory purpose or invidious intent in their adoption.8 The lower
courts held that without evidence of disparate treatment or discriminatory
intent, the plaintiffs could not state a claim for discrimination.
The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that Title VII "proscribes not
only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but dis-
criminatory in operation."9 The Court went on to note that the key to
7. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The theory had been advanced by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission some years before. Inclusive Cntys., 135 S. Ct. at 2528-29
(Thomas, J., dissenting). See also Olatunde Johnson, The Agency Roots of Disparate
Impact, 49 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 125 (2014).
8. While the first two contentions may have been true, the third was almost cer-
tainly not. The company had deliberately created a segregated work force by en-
gaging in overtly discriminatory practices right up until the day Title VII took ef-
fect, at which point it adopted the challenged policies.
9. Duke Power, 401 U.S. at 431.
evaluating such practices is whether they can be justified by business ne-
cessity: "If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes
cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohib-
ited." 0 In Griggs, the jobs at issue involved manual labor. The company
was unable to persuasively argue the need for the testing and degree re-
quirements. Moreover, the company had previously allowed white em-
ployees to work in higher-ranking positions without these credentials
and these employees had apparently performed their jobs satisfactorily,
further demonstrating that the requirements lacked any connection to
job performance.
A series of cases followed in which lower federal courts allowed dispa-
rate impact theory to apply to Equal Protection claims in the housing con-
text." Although these cases dealt with housing, the claims were brought
under the Equal Protection Clause because the defendants were munici-
palities. Some of these courts also recognized a housing-specific form of
disparate impact claim, one that looked to the impact on the affected com-
munity as a whole rather than on any one particular group. Specifically,
they found that a practice or policy could also violate the law if it "perpet-
uates segregation and thereby prevents interracial association."1 2
The first case to recognize disparate impact theory in a claim brought
under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) was United States v. City of Black
Jack." When the events giving rise to the lawsuit began, Black Jack was
an unincorporated area in suburban St. Louis. Black Jack's population
was virtually all white, while nearby St. Louis had a significant black pop-
ulation that was trapped in overcrowded, dilapidated, and segregated
housing conditions. A nonprofit organization began planning a multifam-
ily development called Park View Heights in the area to create alternative
housing opportunities for low- and moderate-income people living in the
ghetto areas of St. Louis, with specific plans to affirmatively market the
development to minorities. 1 4
Opposition by white residents was both fierce and swift. They immedi-
ately began a drive to incorporate the area. One month after incorporation,
the city's first official act was to pass a zoning ordinance prohibiting the
10. Id. at 430.
11. See generally Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d
409 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd sub nom., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 271 (1977); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, Miss., 461 F.2d 1171 (5th
Cir. 1972); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.
1970); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
Adopting the language of strict scrutiny, these cases defined the defense burden
as one of demonstrating a compelling government interest.
12. See, e.g. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283,
1290 (7th Cir. 1977).
13. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
14. Id. at 1182.
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construction of any new multifamily dwellings, effectively killing the project.
The ordinance was challenged by both the developer and the Department of
Justice (DOJ). DOJ argued that the ordinance violated the FHA because it
was both motivated by racial animus and was discriminatory in effect.
Despite significant evidence that the ordinance was in fact racially mo-
tivated, 5 the Eighth Circuit treated the case solely as one involving fa-
cially neutral actions. The court found that the ordinance would indeed
have a disparate impact, both because it would disproportionately affect
blacks living in the region (85 percent of whom would otherwise be priced
out of Black Jack)"6 and because this would further entrench the area's
segregated patterns." In light of this impact, the court held that:
The plaintiff need make no showing whatsoever that the action resulting in
racial discrimination in housing was racially motivated. . . . Effect, and not
motivation, is the touchstone, in part because clever men may easily con-
ceal their motivations, but more importantly because whatever our law
was once, we now firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of thought-
lessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and the public in-
terest as the perversity of a willful scheme.'"
In doing so, the court cited almost exclusively to the Equal Protection
Clause cases and conducted its analysis accordingly, with just a bare ref-
erence to Griggs. In particular, the court required the city to prove a com-
pelling government interest (an equal protection standard) in order to
avoid liability.1 9
The Supreme Court later overruled the equal protection cases in Wash-
ington v. Davis2 0 and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing De-
velopment Corp.,2 1 holding that disparate impact theory could not be used
for constitutional claims. Subsequent housing cases thus had to rely more
explicitly on the statutory basis for the theory, specifically the similarities
in purpose and text between Title VII and the FHA. Significantly, how-
ever, Washington and Arlington Heights did not disturb the consensus
that disparate impact theory could be used to challenge practices that per-
petuate housing segregation. 2 2 They merely found that such claims could
not be brought pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause.
15. Id. at 1185 n.3 ("The uncontradicted evidence indicates that, at all levels of
opposition, race played a significant role, both in the drive to incorporate and the
decision to rezone.").
16. Id. at 1186.
17. Id. ("[blocking the development] would contribute to the perpetuation of
segregation in a community which was 99 percent white").
18. Id. at 1185 (internal quotations omitted).
19. Id. at 1186-87.
20. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
21. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
22. Washington was an employment discrimination case, so the segregation
issue was not presented. In Arlington Heights, the Court refused to weigh in on
Over the ensuing decades, a consensus developed among all nine of the
federal courts of appeal to consider the issue that disparate impact theory
was viable in FHA cases and that an unlawful disparate impact could in-
clude perpetuation of segregation.2 3 Disparate impact theory has been
used to challenge a variety of practices under the FHA, including exclu-
sionary zoning ordinances, administration of Section 8 vouchers, mort-
gage lending practices, occupancy restrictions, and demolition and siting
of subsidized housing. To the extent there was any disagreement among
the courts, it was about how the respective burdens of the parties should
be allocated when the claim was presented.
In 2013, HUD issued a disparate impact regulation that explicitly en-
dorsed the use of the disparate impact theory to challenge practices that
have a discriminatory effect or that "create, increase, reinforce, or perpet-
uate segregated housing patterns."2 4 The regulation also sets forth the
proper framework for the burden-shifting analysis.2 5 First, the plaintiff
must prove that a challenged practice causes a disparate impact or segre-
gated housing patterns based on protected characteristics. The burden of
proof then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the challenged prac-
tice "is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, non-
discriminatory interests."2 6 If the defendant meets this burden the
plaintiff may still prevail by demonstrating that these interests "could
be served by a practice that has a less discriminatory effect." 2 7
II. The First Two Supreme Court Cases
In recent years, the Supreme Court has tried multiple times to hear the
issue of whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA. It
granted certiorari in two cases, both of which settled prior to oral argu-
ment, in as many years. The first case, Magner v. Gallagher,28 was brought
whether any of the defendant's conduct might violate the FHA. 429 U.S. at 271. On
remand, the Seventh Circuit found both that disparate impact theory was available
under the FHA and that the defendant's actions, which perpetuated racial segrega-
tion, violated the statute. See 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977).
23. In addition to Black Jack and Arlington Heights, see, e.g., Langlois v. Abington
Housing Authority, 207 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2000); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of
Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988); Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d
126 (3d Cir. 1977); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065-66 (4th Cir.
1982); United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981); Keith v. Volpe,
858 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1988); City of Hawthorne v. Wright, 493 U.S. 913 (1989); and
Jackson v. Okaloosa County, 21 F.3d 1531 (11th Cir. 1994).
24. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500; Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discrimi-
natory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013).
25. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1)-(3).
26. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2).
27. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3).
28. The case was originally brought as Steinhauser v. City of St. Paul, 595
F. Supp. 2d 987 (D. Minn. 2008), aff'd in part rev'd in part, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir.
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by owners of low-income properties in St. Paul, Minnesota. The city's
code enforcement authorities had recently begun aggressively enforcing
its property maintenance code in an attempt to crack down on slum con-
ditions, including health and safety violations and rodent infestations, in
the city's low-income housing stock. As a result of the city's enforcement
efforts, the property owners were potentially subject to increased mainte-
nance costs, fees, condemnations, and forced sales of their properties.
The owners challenged the city's code enforcement practices using a
number of statutes and theories, one of which was a disparate impact
claim under the FHA. Specifically, they claimed that the city had an af-
fordable housing shortage, that blacks made up a disproportionate per-
centage of households in the city that relied on affordable housing, that
the city's code enforcement practices increased costs for property owners
that rent to low-income tenants, and that this increased burden resulted in
less affordable housing in the city because the owners would have to raise
rents or potentially go out of business. All of this, they argued, would re-
sult in a disproportionate adverse effect on blacks. The district court
found that the owners had failed to establish any of their claims. On ap-
peal, the Eight Circuit upheld the dismissal of all claims except the one
based on disparate impact theory. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to determine two issues: (1) whether disparate impact theory is cognizable
under the FHA; and (2) if so, what burden-shifting analysis should be
used .29
Magner settled before the Court could hear oral argument on the case,
in large part because fair housing advocates feared a negative outcome.3 0
The case did not present particularly good facts for the plaintiffs, who
were raising the disparate impact claim not for themselves but on behalf
of their tenants (who by all accounts were living in deplorable conditions).
Moreover, HUD's disparate impact regulation had been proposed but was
not yet final, so advocates needed to buy some time.
The following year the Court agreed to hear another disparate impact
case, Township of Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action.3 1 The
case arose out of a plan by the Township of Mt. Holly, New Jersey, to re-
develop one of its neighborhoods, an area called Mt. Holly Gardens.
Seventy-five percent of the Gardens residents were minorities and most
2010). This summary is based on the facts as set forth in the appellate court opin-
ion, as well as the briefs filed by the parties to the Supreme Court.
29. 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (granting cert.).
30. 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012) (dismissing cert.). See Review and Outlook, The Talented
Mr. Perez, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 21, 2013) (describing a deal that then-HUD Secretary
Perez struck with the City of St. Paul to dismiss the case in favor for HUD's with-
drawal of an unrelated claim against the city).
31. No. 08-2584, 2011 WL 9405 (D.N.J. 2011), rev'd, 658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011).
This summary is based on the facts as set forth in the appellate court opinion, as
well as the briefs filed by the parties to the Supreme Court.
were classified as "very low" or extremely low" income. More than half of
the properties were rentals, many of which were owned by absentee land-
lords that did not maintain them well. There was no homeowners associ-
ation to provide for the upkeep of common areas or alleys. Overcrowding,
vacancies, drainage, lack of parking, and crime were all problems.
Nevertheless, the population of the Gardens was relatively stable: 81 per-
cent of the homeowners had lived in their homes for at least nine years,
and 72 percent of renters had lived there for at least five years.
The township adopted a redevelopment plan that called for the acqui-
sition and demolition of all of the existing homes in the Gardens. A new
community called the Villages at Parker's Mill would be built in its place.
The vast majority of Garden residents would be permanently displaced by
the plan. While existing homes in the Gardens sold for between $64,000
and $81,000, the estimated cost of a new home in the Villages was between
$200,000 and $275,000. It was also alleged that the plan would perpetuate
segregation in the township because only 29 percent of minority house-
holds in the area would be able to afford housing in the redeveloped Vil-
lages, whereas 79 percent of the township's white households could af-
ford to live there.
The district court denied the residents' request for injunctive relief,
concluding that they failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion under the FHA and that, even if they had, they failed to show an
available alternative that would have had a lesser impact. The residents
appealed to the Third Circuit, which reversed the district court's decision.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether dispa-
rate impact was cognizable under the FHA.3 2 This case also settled before
the Court could hear oral argument, apparently due to a change in polit-
ical leadership in the township.3 3
III. TDHCA v. Inclusive Communities
Inclusive Communities arose out of a challenge to the Low Income Hous-
ing Tax Credit (LIHTC) allocations made by the Texas Department of
Housing and Community Affairs (TDHCA) in the Dallas metropolitan
area. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. is a non-profit organization
whose mission is to further racial and socioeconomic integration in the Dal-
las metropolitan area. In 2004, it was appointed to be the fund administra-
tor and housing mobility provider in order to implement the remedy in a
Dallas public housing desegregation case.3 4 In particular, Inclusive Com-
munities assists low-income families, a significant number of whom are
black, who are eligible for the Dallas Housing Authority's Housing Choice
Voucher Program in finding affordable housing in predominantly white
32. 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013) (granting cert.).
33. 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013) (dismissing cert.).
34. Walker v. HUD, 734 F. Supp. 1289 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
274 Journal of Affordable Housing Volume 24, Number 2 2015
Supreme Court Retains an Uneasy Status Quo with Inclusive Communities 275
suburban neighborhoods. A development that receives an LIHTC cannot
refuse to accept tenants because of their use of vouchers. As a result, Inclu-
sive Communities has an interest in where LIHTC developments are lo-
cated in the Dallas metropolitan area because this will determine where
it can help place its clients.
Competition for LIHTCs is fierce and the program has historically been
oversubscribed by a ratio of two-to-one in Texas. The department awards
LIHTCs according to a complex formula governed by both state and federal
statutes. For the most desirable LIHTC, the 9 percent credit, federal law re-
quires that designated agencies adopt a Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP)
that includes particular selection criteria and preferences. One such crite-
rion is the length of the waiting list for public housing in the area.3 5 Prefer-
ences include that the housing contribute to a "concerted community revi-
talization plan" and be built in predominantly low-income census tracts.3 6
Texas state law requires the department to first determine whether an
application satisfies the QAP threshold criteria. Then it must use a point
system in order to score and rank qualifying applications, specifically by
prioritizing the eleven statutory criteria (referred to as "above-the-line" cri-
teria) in descending order. The department may use additional "below-the-
line" criteria to supplement its decision-making, but none of these criteria
may outweigh any "above-the-line" factors.
Inclusive Communities brought a disparate impact claim in 2008, alleg-
ing that the department disproportionately approved LIHTCs in minority
concentrated neighborhoods and disproportionately disapproved them in
predominantly white neighborhoods.3 7 Inclusive Communities alleged
that from 1995 to 2009, the department did not allocate any LIHTCs for
units in predominantly white census tracts within the City of Dallas. As
a result, by 2008 more than 92 percent of LIHTC units in Dallas were lo-
cated in minority census tracts. When looking at the metro area as a
whole, between 1999 and 2008, the department approved tax credits for
49.7 percent of proposed units in areas that were at least 90 percent minor-
ity, but approved only 37.4 percent of proposed units in areas that were at
least 90 percent white. Thus, according to Inclusive Communities, the de-
partment's allocation practices have caused low-income housing to be
concentrated in minority areas and less available in white areas, which
in turn maintains and perpetuates segregated housing patterns.
The department countered that any statistical disparity in LIHTC alloca-
tion arose directly from federal and state laws that required it to use fixed
criteria and preferences, some of which are correlated with race, in its
35. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(1)(C).
36. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(1)(B).
37. 860 F. Supp. 2d 312 (N.D. Tex. 2012), rev'd, 747 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2014). This
summary is based on the facts as set forth in the appellate court opinion, as well as
the briefs filed by the parties to the Supreme Court.
decision making. Although the district court assumed that the department's
interest in complying with the law was legitimate and bona fide, it con-
cluded that the department had failed to prove the absence of any alterna-
tive that would reduce the statistical disparity in allocation rates.3 8
After the trial, while the district court was considering the injunctive
remedy, it granted permission to Frazier Revitalization, Inc. (FRI) to inter-
vene on the side of the department to represent the interests of developers
and other organizations that seek to revitalize low-income neighbor-
hoods.3 9 FRI is a nonprofit organization that was formed to implement
a revitalization plan for the Frazier Courts neighborhood, a predomi-
nantly black area that has experienced significant decline. The Frazier
Neighborhood Plan called for more than $270 million in new develop-
ment to create a mixed-income neighborhood with affordable housing
and a full range of basic services. FRI depends upon LIHTC to fund
these efforts. It argued that requiring the department to increase its allo-
cation of tax credits to projects in more affluent white areas would reduce
the amount of credits available to Frazier and other low-income minority
neighborhoods, which are the areas that the credits were intended to help
in the first place.
The case was appealed to the Fifth Circuit. While the appeal was pend-
ing, HUD issued its regulation setting forth the burden-shifting framework
for adjudicating disparate impact claims. The regulation clarified that the
plaintiff has the burden at "step three" of showing that the defendant's in-
terests can be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory ef-
fect.4 0 The Fifth Circuit determined that the lower court had erred by plac-
ing the burden on the defendant to prove that no less discriminatory
alternative existed. Thus, it upheld the use of disparate impact theory but
reversed and remanded the case for a proper "step three" analysis. The de-
partment petitioned for certiorari; the petition was granted on the question
of whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA.41
IV. The Supreme Court's Opinion
The opinion, written for a five-to-four majority by Justice Kennedy,
held squarely that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the
FHA. Other than the fact that many prognosticators feared the Court
would come out the other way, this result is not particularly remarkable
in the sense that it merely leaves existing law and precedent undisturbed.
As noted previously, the circuits had long unanimously recognized
38. The Court suggested that the Department could add "below-the-line" crite-
ria or otherwise adjust its scoring formula to achieve greater parity in LIHTC allo-
cation. No. 3:08-CV-0546-D, 2012 WL 3201401 (Aug. 7, 2012).
39. No. 3:08-CV-0546-D, 2012 WL 2133667 (N.D. Tex. June 12, 2012).
40. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3).
41. 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014).
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disparate impact theory and HUD has issued a regulation endorsing it.42
The opinion is noteworthy, however, for what it says both about the reach
and purpose of fair housing law and for the limitations that it sets on that
reach.
A. Broad Integrationist Purpose
Although the word "integration" is nowhere mentioned in the Fair
Housing Act, the majority opinion offered unequivocal recognition of
the fact that segregation is a serious social harm that the statute was in-
tended to combat. Early in the opinion, Justice Kennedy cited the Presi-
dent's Advisory Commission Report on Civil Disorders (commonly
known as the Kerner Commission) and its urgent, clarion call to end
the deepening racial division in American society. 43 Justice Kennedy ad-
mitted that "[miuch progress remains to be made in our Nation's contin-
uing struggle against racial isolation"44 and acknowledged "the Fair
Housing Act's continuing role in moving the nation toward a more inte-
grated society." 45
Additionally, the majority opinion acknowledged that today's segre-
gated residential patterns can be traced back to government policieS46
and recognized how entrenched and intractable these patterns can
be. 47 All of this led to the sweeping conclusion that "[riecognition of
disparate-impact claims is consistent with the FHA's central purpose ...
to eradicate discriminatory practices within a sector of our Nation's
economy." 48
Finally, and significantly, the Court addressed a potential conflict be-
tween disparate impact theory and equal protection. In previous cases,
the Court and individual justices had questioned whether race-conscious
measures to achieve integration and avoid disparate impact liability were
constitutional. 49 In their briefs in Inclusive Communities, the department
42. It is significant that the Court based its conclusion on its interpretation of
the statute rather than on deference to the HUD regulation.
43. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2516 (2015).
44. Id. at 2525.
45. Id. at 2525-26.
46. Id. at 2515 ("[V]arious practices were followed, sometimes with governmen-
tal support, to encourage and maintain the separation of the races.").
47. Id. ("De jure residential segregation by race was declared unconstitutional
almost a century ago, but its vestiges remain today, intertwined with the country's
economic and social life.").
48. Id. at 2521.
49. For example, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dis-
trict No. 1, the Court struck down a school assignment plan that would assign stu-
dents in a pro-integrative manner, with Chief Justice Roberts admonishing that
"[t]he way to stop discriminating on the basis of race is to stop discriminating
on the basis of race." 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007). In Ricci v. DeStefano, a municipality
and its amici argued that interpreting the FHA to incorporate disparate
impact theory would violate the Constitution because it would force mu-
nicipalities into race-based or, at least, race-conscious decision-making.
This argument, taken to its logical conclusion, would forbid municipal-
ities from ever considering the racial impacts of their zoning, community
development, and housing policies. The majority rejected this claim, hold-
ing that laws imposing liability for unjustified disparate impact are not
themselves unconstitutionally discriminatory even though they aim to
achieve a result-integration-that is racially defined. "When setting
their larger goals," Justice Kennedy advised, "local housing authorities
may choose to foster diversity and combat racial isolation with race-
neutral tools, and mere awareness of race in attempting to solve the prob-
lems facing inner cities does not doom that endeavor from the outset."50
B. Limitations in Practice: Housing and Neighborhood Improvement
The only issue before the Court in Inclusive Communities was whether
disparate impact theory could be used in a FHA case. Nevertheless, the
majority included a brief, but crucial, paragraph about the merits of the
plaintiff's case that hints at a significant limitation on the use of disparate
impact theory in the future. Specifically, the opinion referred critically to
the plaintiff's use of disparate impact theory in the case at bar as a "novel
theory of liability."" Justice Kennedy distinguished this case from what
he called "the heartland" of disparate impact suits that target artificial bar-
riers to housing, particularly "zoning laws and other housing restrictions
that function unfairly to exclude minorities from certain neighborhoods
without any sufficient justification." 52
This somewhat opaque reference is to a distinction first noted by Stacy
Seicshnaydre in her article, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Ap-
pellate Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair Hous-
ing Act.5 In the article, which the Court cites, Professor Seicshnaydre
administered a qualifying exam for firefighting jobs that clearly had a disparate im-
pact on minorities. The municipality chose to disregard the exams and justified this
decision by arguing that if it used the test results in hiring, it would almost cer-
tainly be sued by disappointed minority applicants under a disparate impact the-
ory. The Court refused to allow this fear to justify the disregarding of the test re-
sults. It reasoned that such an action was itself race-based, and therefore using
disparate impact theory to require this result would itself violate Title VII. 557
U.S. 557 (2009). Justice Scalia wrote separately to warn about the coming "war" be-
tween disparate impact and equal protection. Id. at 594-96.
50. Inclusive Cntys., 135 S. Ct. at 2525.
51. Id. at 2522.
52. Id. at 2521-22.
53. Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact, An Appellate
Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 63
Am. U. L. REV. 357 (2013).
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posits that housing disparate impact cases can be sorted into two basic
types: (1) "housing barrier" cases, which challenge policies that prevent
the construction of housing for minority group members or otherwise
deny minority households freedom of movement in the wider housing
marketplace;5 4 and (2) "housing improvement" cases, which challenge
policies that are intended to improve the condition of housing and/or
the surrounding neighborhood. 5 In the first type of case, the remedy
sought is simply the removal of the housing barrier so that new housing
opportunities can be created in the private market. In the latter, the rem-
edy sought is typically to prevent a plaintiff's displacement from existing
housing, usually by altering or enjoining the policy meant to improve the
housing or neighborhood.
City of Black Jack is an example of a housing barrier case. There, a mu-
nicipal action prevented the construction of affordable housing that might
attract minority families. In other words, the city stood in the way of mi-
nority housing opportunities that otherwise would have been created by a
private organization. All the plaintiffs sought was the modification of the
exclusionary zoning ordinance so that the housing could proceed.
In contrast, the two recent disparate impact cases to reach the Supreme
Court, Magner and Mt. Holly Gardens, can be classified as housing improve-
ment cases. Both involved challenges to municipal attempts to improve
housing conditions, either through code enforcement or neighborhood re-
development. In both cases, these attempts were likely to displace the exist-
ing residents who were disproportionately minority. In both cases, the
plaintiffs were asking that the municipality significantly alter or abandon
its efforts.
As Professor Seicshnaydre notes, housing improvement cases do not
fare well in the courts. At the appellate level, housing improvement cases
are half as likely to result in positive decisions for plaintiffs as housing bar-
rier cases.5 6 Put another way, 44 percent of all positive disparate impact
outcomes at the appellate level were housing barrier challenges, while
just 16.7 percent involved housing improvement challenges.5 7 All of this
leads Professor Seicshnaydre to conclude that in the forty years that courts
have been applying disparate impact theory to housing cases, "they have
been far more receptive to Housing Barrier claims than to Housing
Improvement Claims."58
54. Id. at 360-61.
55. Id. at 361.
56. Housing barrier challenges were successful 42 percent of the time, whereas
housing improvement challenges were successful only 21 percent of the time. Id. at
400-01.
57. Id. at 402.
58. Id.
Justice Kennedy clearly viewed Inclusive Communities as a housing im-
provement case, describing the use of disparate impact theory as "novel"
and casting serious doubt on whether Inclusive Communities could pre-
vail on the merits. He cautioned that disparate impact claims should
not be used to micromanage the complex, multifactor decisions of housing
developers and municipal officials:
It would be paradoxical to construe the FHA to impose onerous costs on
actors who encourage revitalizing dilapidated housing in our Nation's cit-
ies merely because some other priority might seem preferable. . . .The FHA
does not decree a particular vision of urban development; and it does not
put housing authorities and private developers in a double bind of liability,
subject to suit whether they choose to rejuvenate a city core or to promote
new low-income housing in suburban communities. 59
Ultimately, Kennedy opined, "[tihis case on remand may be seen simply
as an attempt to second-guess which of two reasonable approaches a
housing authority should follow in the sound exercise of its discretion
in allocating tax credits for low-income housing."60
And therein lies the rub: in disparate impact cases, the analysis almost
always turns on the defendant's ability to demonstrate that the challenged
practice, in the language of the rule, "is necessary to achieve one or more
substantial, legitimate, non-discriminatory interests," versus the plaintiff's
ability to prove that another, less discriminatory alternative is available.
The Inclusive Communities opinion, in essence, reminds us that fostering
integration is just on one of many legitimate interests, such as revitalizing
dilapidated neighborhoods, ensuring compliance with health and safety
codes, and providing affordable housing, that a local government might
pursue.6 1 This may well mean that housing improvement cases, which
by definition involve legitimate goals, will always be an uphill battle on
the merits for fair housing advocates using disparate impact theory.
V. Analysis and Ramifications
A. Enrichment-Integration Tension
The Court's approach in Inclusive Communities reflects a tension that
has existed since the dawn of the modern fair housing movement. In
its thorough discussion of the riots that took place throughout the United
States in 1967, the Kerner Commission identified housing discrimination
and segregation, as well as the slum conditions in urban ghettos with a
59. Inclusive Cntys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523.
60. Id. at 2522.
61. Id. at 2522 ("An important and appropriate means of ensuring that dispa-
rate impact liability is properly limited is to give housing authorities and private
developers leeway to state and explain the valid interests served by their
policies.").
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high concentration of black residents, as contributing factors to the
unrest. 62
The Commission also recognized that responding to these conditions
was one of the great policy challenges of our time. As for how to do so,
the Commission identified two plausible approaches.6 ' The first was "a
policy of 'enrichment"' aimed at improving the quality of life in segre-
gated areas while abandoning integration as a goal.64 The second was to
pursue integration by combining enrichment measures with policies
that will break up segregated patterns and encourage freedom of mobil-
ity.65 The Commission was clear that the enrichment choice without a
commitment to integration would ultimately fail to advance the cause
of equality. "[Eiquality cannot be achieved," wrote the Commission,
"under conditions of nearly complete separation. In a country where
the economy, and particularly the resources of employment, are predom-
inantly white, a policy of separation can only relegate Negroes to a perma-
nently inferior economic status."6 6
Thus, the Commission advocated the use of both approaches, but with
enrichment being the adjunct or interim strategy and integration being the
ultimate goal. 67 The Commission recommended an "all of the above" ap-
proach, including a massive increase in affordable housing; significant
urban renewal, but with a focus on preserving housing for low-income
people; and programs to expand low and moderate income housing
into higher income areas.6 8
If we fast forward to the present day, it would seem that the Commis-
sion's suggestions have gone unheeded. Segregation has declined slightly
over the past few decades, but still persists at unacceptably high levels in
most major metropolitan areas. 6 9 The consequences of this are numerous
62. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968).
63. Technically, the Commission offered three approaches, but the first was to
do nothing at all ("the Present Policies" choice). Inaction, the Commission deter-
mined, was not a valid option. Id. at 218-21.
64. Id. at 222-24.
65. Id. at 224-25.
66. Id. at 10.
67. Id. ("Enrichment must be an important adjunct to integration, for no matter
how ambitious or energetic the program, few Negroes now living in central cities
can be quickly integrated. In the meantime, large-scale improvement in the quality
of ghetto life is essential. But this can be no more than an interim strategy. Pro-
grams must be developed which will permit substantial Negro movement out of
the ghettos.").
68. Id. at 260-63.
69. John R. Logan & Brian J. Stults, The Persistence of Segregation in the Metropolis:
New Findings from the 2010 Census, US 2010, at 4-10 (Mar. 24, 2011), available at
http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Data/Report/report2.pdf (finding that black-
white segregation and isolation remain "very high").
and severe. 7 0 Higher concentrations of minorities in a neighborhood are
associated with lower home values, even with all other variables held
constant.7 ' As a result, segregation limits people's accumulation of wealth
through asset appreciation.7 2 Racially segregated neighborhoods tend to
experience reduced educational and employment opportunities, more
crime, and higher mortality rates.73 Finally, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, segregation undermines our national unity, leads to racial misun-
derstanding, and causes us to continue living, in the words of the Kerner
Commission, as "two societies, one black, one white-separate and
unequal."7 4
At least some of America's stubbornly persistent segregated patterns
can be traced to state and federal housing policies that have focused
more on the provision of affordable housing in and redevelopment of dis-
tressed minority areas than on the politically challenging work of encour-
aging integration.7' The LIHTC is a prime example of such a policy. Com-
mentators have long pointed out that the program reinforces segregated
patterns because it encourages the siting of low-income housing in
areas that already have a high concentration of poverty.76 Between 1995
70. See James Robert Breymaier, The Need to Prioritize the Affirmative Furthering of
Fair Housing, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 245, 252 (2009) ("[Segregated housing patterns] are
harmful to everyone. Promoting integrated communities would stimulate positive
changes to improved affordable housing dispersion, balanced economic develop-
ment, equitable school improvement, and sustainable growth patterns."). See gen-
erally Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993).
71. David R. Harris, "Property Values Drop When Blacks Move In, Because .
Racial and Socioeconomic Determinants of Neighborhood Desirability, 64 AM. Soc. REV.
461 (1999) (finding a pronounced skew in neighborhood desirability and housing
prices in segregated neighborhoods).
72. Nancy A. Denton, The Role of Residential Segregation in Promoting and Main-
taining Inequality in Wealth and Property, 34 IND. L. REV. 1199, 1206 (2001).
73. Robert G. Schwemm, Overcoming Barriers to Integrated Housing: A Back-to the-
Future Reflection on the Fair Housing Act's "Affirmatively Further" Mandate, 100
Ky. L.J. 125, 135 (2011-12).
74. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 62, at 1.
75. For a thorough discussion of the tension between fair housing and afford-
able housing policy, see Henry Korman, Underwriting for Fair Housing? Achieving
Civil Rights Goals in Affordable Housing Programs, 14-4 J. AFFORDABLE Hous. &
CMTY. DEV. L. 292 (2005). See also Michelle Adams, Separate and [Uniequal: Housing
Choice, Mobility, and Equalization in the Federally Subsidized Housing Program, 71
TUL. L. REV. 413 (1996); Florence Wagman Roisman, Keeping the Promise: Ending Ra-
cial Discrimination and Segregation in Federally Financed Housing, 48 How. L.J. (2005);
Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, How Government Housing Perpetuates Racial Segregation: Les-
sons From Post-Katrina New Orleans, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 661 (2011).
76. Florence Wagman Roisman, Mandates Unsatisfied: The Low Income Housing
Tax Credit Program and the Civil Rights Laws, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1011 (1998);
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and 2006, 36.8 percent of LIHTC units were located in census tracts with
populations that were more than 60 percent minority, as compared to only
17.6 percent of households located in such census tracts generally.77 In the
St. Louis metropolitan area, for example, 62 percent of LIHTC properties
are in majority black census tracts.
The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program is another
example of a well-intentioned government program that has tended to in-
tensify segregation. Many communities use their community develop-
ment funds in a manner that perpetuates segregation, either by continuing
to site low-income housing in predominantly minority neighborhoods or
redeveloping minority neighborhoods and displacing the existing resi-
dents. Recent litigation against one such grant recipient, Westchester
County, New York, illustrates the problem. From 2000 to 2006, Westche-
ster County received CDBG funds totaling $52 million. The county was
(and still is) extremely racially segregated. Although it certified to HUD
that it would use these funds in a manner that affirmatively furthered
fair housing, the county focused only on affordable housing, not fair,
i.e., pro-integrative, housing. As a result, the country's development
and siting of affordable housing actually exacerbated the segregated
patterns.
7 8
Even the Housing Choice Voucher program may exacerbate segrega-
tion and concentrate poverty. 79 Disparities in housing prices often mean
that most of the housing units that a voucher can cover are located in
lower-income, minority communities. When housing is located in more
affluent white neighborhoods, voucher holders may experience hostility
from existing residents and landlords may refuse to accept vouchers with-
out laws in place prohibiting source-of-income discrimination. Bureau-
cratic obstacles may hinder voucher holders who wish to make a pro-
integrative move from one jurisdiction to another.
These three programs represent some of the most significant federal
programs that encourage access to and development of affordable
Myron Orfield, Racial Integration and Community Revitalization: Applying the Fair
Housing Act to the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1747 (2005).
77. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Economic
Affairs, Updating the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) Database: Projects
Placed in Service Through 2006, at 57 ex. 4-15.
78. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York, Inc. v.
Westchester Cnty., N.Y., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
79. Stefanie DeLuca, Philip M. E. Garboden & Peter Rosenblatt, Segregating Shel-
ter: How Housing Policies Shape the Residential Locations of Low-Income Minority Fam-
ilies, 647 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sn. 268 (2013) (finding that minority
voucher holders in Mobile, Alabama, rarely escape poor, segregated communities);
John Eligon, An Indelible Black-and-White Line, N.Y. TIMEs, at Al (Aug. 9, 2015) (not-
ing that there are nearly twenty times as many Section 8 renters in predominantly
black north St. Louis County than in predominantly white south St. Louis County).
housing. But to the extent that they increase segregation, decisions that
municipal governments and housing authorities make in implementing
these programs also represent some of the most likely targets for "housing
improvement" challenges based upon disparate impact theory.
The Inclusive Communities opinion reveals an understandable reluc-
tance to impose liability on government attempts to revitalize neighbor-
hoods, cure blighted conditions, and develop affordable housing. Such
an outcome would not only be unsound as a matter of policy, it would
also harm the very minority group members whom the FHA was in-
tended to help. As Justice Kennedy makes clear, "If the specter of
disparate-impact litigation causes private developers to no longer con-
struct or renovate housing units for low-income individuals, then the
FHA would have undermined its own purpose as well as the free-market
system." 0 Yet truly sustainable long-term solutions will be elusive if local
governments fail to make the hard choices necessary to foster integration.
B. Ongoing Difficulty of Disparate Impact Claims
Any discussion of disparate impact theory would be remiss without a
realistic look at the existing state of affairs with respect to disparate impact
claims in the courts: they are infrequently made and unlikely to result in a
positive outcome for plaintiffs. As Professor Seicshnaydre's survey
revealed, plaintiffs fare poorly in all types of disparate impact cases, not
just housing improvement challenges. Her survey found that plaintiffs re-
ceived positive decisions in less than 20 percent of all housing disparate
impact claims considered on appeal." This statistic fails to capture the
state of play today: the numbers have been steadily dropping over time.
Most of the successes occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. By the 1990s, the
success rate had dropped to 13 percent, and it was down to just over
8 percent by the 2000s.8 2
Another way to look at how plaintiffs fare is by comparing the affir-
mance and reversal rate of plaintiff-favorable district court rulings to
those of rulings that favor defendants. Professor Seicshnaydre found
that, while the overall affirmance rate for federal civil appeals is roughly
80 percent, plaintiffs have gotten affirmances of favorable lower court de-
cisions in housing disparate impact cases only 33.3 percent of the time. 3
Defendants, in contrast, have an affirmance rate of 83.8 percent.8 4
There are a number of possible explanations for this poor showing. One
is that disparate impact cases are often highly technical and therefore dif-
ficult to bring. Failure to properly identify the affected groups will prove
80. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2524 (2015).
81. Seicshnaydre, supra note 53, at 393.
82. Id. at 393-94.
83. Id. at 399.
84. Id. at 398.
284 Journal of Affordable Housing Volume 24, Number 2 2015
Supreme Court Retains an Uneasy Status Quo with Inclusive Communities 285
fatal to the plaintiff's prima facie case. Fair housing plaintiffs may be tack-
ing weak disparate impact claims onto intentional discrimination claims
as insurance in case their intent evidence fails. Courts may be increasingly
unwilling to impose liability against defendants that are attempting to ad-
dress legitimate concerns.
Of course, the litigation statistics do not tell the whole story. Many
cases settle before ever reaching the summary judgment or trial phase,
so FHA plaintiffs proceeding under disparate impact theory may be
achieving favorable results through settlement. It is clear that local gov-
ernments and housing authorities have made fundamental changes to
the ways they operate as a result of the threat of disparate impact liability.
Thus, disparate impact theory has surely had more of an impact than the
stark litigation numbers would indicate. Still, disparate impact theory's
infrequency of use and success in court does suggest that, despite its con-
ceptual significance, it has failed to live up to its promise. 5
Interestingly, just a few weeks after the Inclusive Communities opinion
was handed down, new developments on the regulatory front may
make disparate impact theory less important as a tool for combatting gov-
ernment policies that entrench segregation. The FHA has long stated that
the federal government, federal agencies, and recipients of federal hous-
ing funds have the duty to "affirmatively further" fair housing, which in-
cludes a mandate to foster integrated living patterns."' For decades this
provision lacked force because HUD failed to ensure compliance by pro-
gram participants or to take action against recipients that failed to com-
ply." In July 2015, HUD promulgated a rule on the affirmatively further-
ing mandate." The rule overhauls the AFFH assessment and planning
framework for program participants and requires HUD to provide each
jurisdiction with national data on racial segregation, poverty concentra-
tion, and access to community assets such as education, transportation,
and jobs in order to facilitate regional planning efforts. It remains to be
85. Rigel C. Oliveri, Beyond Disparate Impact: How the Fair Housing Movement Can
Move On, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 625 (2015).
86. Section 3608 of the FHA directs HUD to administer its programs and activ-
ities relating to housing and urban development "in a manner affirmatively to fur-
ther the [FHA's] policies." The statute that created the CDBG also requires grant
recipients to certify to HUD that their grant will be administered in conformity
with the FHA and that the recipient will use the funds in such a manner to "affir-
matively further fair housing." 42 U.S.C. § 5304(b)(2). Although the term "affirma-
tively further" is not defined, the legislative history of the FHA makes clear that
Congress intended for the statute both to eradicate housing discrimination and
to foster integrated living patterns.
87. Robert G. Schwemm, Overcoming Barriers to Integrated Housing: A Back-to the-
Future Reflection on the Fair Housing Act's "Affirmatively Further" Mandate, 100 Ky.
L.J. 125, 153-54 (2011-12).
88. 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, 903 (July 16, 2015).
seen whether, and to what extent, this new rule helps to promote diverse,
inclusive communities of opportunity.8 9 Nevertheless, its passage sug-
gests a renewed focus on the part of HUD toward working for this goal.9 0
VI. Conclusion
Ultimately, Inclusive Communities left existing precedent intact, preserv-
ing a legal theory that was in many ways more important in theory than in
practice. Justice Kennedy's nuanced opinion plumbed longstanding ten-
sions between the Fair Housing Act's pro-integrationist focus and afford-
able housing policy. By affirming the significance of integration as a goal
but then questioning whether disparate impact theory can succeed in a
number of the cases that might be brought to vindicate this goal, the
Court handed fair housing advocates an unquestionable, but qualified,
victory.
Still, a victory is a victory, and with social ills as pervasive and intrac-
table as housing discrimination and residential segregation, fair housing
advocates want every tool at their disposal. Recent events, including the
racial unrest in Ferguson and other segregated cities, the litigation against
Westchester County, and HUD's recent promulgation of rules both for af-
firmatively furthering fair housing and for disparate impact theory have
reinvigorated the discussion about how government housing policy,
agency practice, and the civil rights laws can be used to combat inequality
and segregation. The Inclusive Communities opinion is a welcome addition
to this debate.
89. See Jonathan J. Sheffield, At Forty-Five Years Old the Obligation to Affirmatively
Further Fair Housing Gets a Face-Lift, But Will It Integrate America's Cities?, 25 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 51 (2014) (arguing that without a private right of action to enforce
these requirements, and until they are adopted by other agencies, particularly the
IRS, progress will remain mixed).
90. Housing Fairness Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 476 Before the Subconm. on Hous.
and Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 110 (2010) (state-
ment by HUD Assistant Sec'y for Fair Hous. and Equal Opportunity John D. Tras-
vina) ("HUD has not always fulfilled its obligation to ensure that our money is
spent in ways that affirmatively further fair housing. In this new day, however,
there is a Department-wide commitment to incorporate our mandate to affirma-
tively furthering fair housing into all of our work so that we can fulfill our shared
goal of truly integrated and balanced living patterns.").
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